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IV 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
MARC CLIFTON BRYANT, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20060045-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals from a conviction for assault by a prisoner, a third 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.5 (West 2004), in the 
Fifth Judicial District Court, Washington County, Utah, the Honorable Eric A. 
Ludlow presiding. 
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (West 
2004). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Issue I: Did the trial court err when it admitted out-of-court statements 
that were not offered for the truth of the matter asserted? 
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Standard of Review: This issue is reviewed under an abuse of discretion 
standard. "'Trial courts have wide discretion in deterrnining relevance, probative 
value, and prejudice/" State v. Kell, 2002 UT 106,1 32, 61 P.3d 1019 (quoting State 
v. Boyd, 2001 UT 30, \ 23, 25 P.3d 985). A reviewing court "'will not reverse the 
trial court's ruling on evidentiary issues unless it is manifest that the trial court so 
abused its discretion that there is a likelihood that injustice resulted/" State v. 
Gomez, 2002 UT 20, \ 12, 63 P.3d 72 (quoting State v. Gentry, 747 P.2d 1032,1035 
(Utah 1987)). 
Issue II: Did the trial court plainly err, or was counsel ineffective, in 
allowing rebuttal testimony demonstrating that the defense witnesses were 
biased against the victim? 
Standard of Review: This issue is unpreserved. Therefore, no standard of 
review applies. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following items are contained in Addendum A: 
Utah R. Evid. 403; 
Utah R. Evid. 404; 
Utah R. Evid. 608; 
Utah R. Evid. 801. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged by Information with assault by a prisoner, a third 
degree felony (Rl). Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted as charged 
(R98). Defendant then filed a motion to arrest judgment (R115-125). Following a 
hearing, the court denied the motion (R134-135). On January 3, 2006, defendant 
was sentenced to serve an indeterminate term not to exceed five years in the 
Utah State prison (R146-150). Defendant timely appealed (R151-152). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Purgatory Correctional Facility had just locked down for the evening on 
February 1, 2005, when defendant attacked his cellmate, Mack Harris 
(R161:64-65, 67). Defendant kneed Harris in the groin, pinned him to the floor, 
wrenched his arm around a metal stool, and punched his face repeatedly, 
ignoring Harris's cries for him to stop (R161:69-74). 
"He took his fists and launched out and hit me/' 
Defendant and Harris had not been "getting along too weir7 since being 
assigned as cellmates (R161:66). Both inmates had unsuccessfully requested 
transfers to different cells (R161:114~15). Harris reported that defendant 
continuously asked him to give up the bottom bunk, which had been assigned to 
Harris, but that Harris consistently refused (R161:66, 97). Harris surmised that 
defendant had begun "trying to bully [him] out" of the cell "to take over the 
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bottom bunk." (R161:66). For instance, defendant regularly stepped on Harris's 
desk and belongings in order to get into the top bunk, even though he could have 
used his own desk for the same purpose (R161:66). 
Just after lockdown on February 1, 2005, Harris was seated at his desk, 
eating his dinner (R161:68). Defendant, seated on the top bunk, "swung his foot 
around over [Harris's] plate where [he] was eating at to put his socks on." 
(R161:68). When Harris asked defendant to cease changing his socks over his 
dinner, defendant responded by "cussing at [Harris] and telling [him], you know 
'F you,'" and that he "didn't want to hear that sh**/' (R161:68). 
Harris noted that defendant had a "boiling point" and was "getting ready 
to explode." (R161:68). Defendant leapt from the top bunk, "got in [Harris's] 
face" and said, "'F you, what you want to do about it?'" (R161:69). Harris 
responded that he was "tired of [defendant] treating [him] like a bitch in here." 
(R161:69). Defendant approached Harris's desk, "took his fists and launched out 
and hit [Harris]." (R161:69). Harris explained: "He hit me in the back of the head 
first, and then as I stood up to push him away, we was [sic] both tussling around 
in the cell for him to get off me." (R161:69). After a few seconds of separation, 
defendant lunged at him again (R161.70-71). Defendant attempted to wrestle 
Harris to the floor, but was unable to do so (R161:73). He subsequently kneed 
Harris in the groin, forced him to the ground, and resumed beating him 
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(R161:70, 73). Harris struggled toward his desk, but defendant seized one of his 
arms, wedged it around the stool, which was bolted to the floor, and started 
punching Harris in the face (R161:74-75). Harris cried, "Enough!" several times 
while defendant pounded his face, but to no effect (R161:74). After defendant 
finally quit beating him, Harris pulled himself up and pressed an intercom 
button to call for assistance from corrections officers (R161:75). 
"It looked like he had been hit by a truck/7 
Corrections officers arrived and removed both defendant and Harris from 
the cell (R161:76, 88, 101). As defendant was escorted out of the cellblock, he 
began informing the other inmates in C block that Harris was "a rat" for calling 
for help and telling them to "take care of [him]." (R161:76). The inmates 
immediately reacted. Officer Justin Seegmiller reported that "multiple inmates 
in that cell block" began yelling at Harris, calling him a "F***ing rat." (R161:90). 
Defendant, whose hands were bloody, was taken to medical where he was 
treated for scrapes on his knuckles (R161:89, 108). Harris gathered his 
belongings, and was taken down to medical, where he was treated for black eyes, 
cuts and abrasions on his face and arm, and a shattered elbow (R161:79~80). 
Officer Seegmiller indicated that Harris's "face was all red. He was swollen. It 
was - he looked like he had hit the pavement pretty hard." (R161:90). "It looked 
like he had been hit by a truck." (R161:90). 
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"You better tell them that it was horseplay/7 
After being treated in medical, Harris was placed in A block, where 
defendant was also being held (R161:77). Defendant began yelling though the 
cell block, "[N]o matter where you are or, you know, any time you go - if you go 
to class or you do anything, I'm going to get you. You better tell them that it was 
horseplay/7 (R161:78). Defendant told Harris to report the attack as horseplay 
several times (R161:78). 
Defendant reported to several officers that he and Harris had merely 
engaged in horseplay in the cell. See (R161:88, 102,109) ("just adult horseplay" 
and "no big deal") ("he basically described that he and his cell mate were horse 
playing") ("He told me that he was involved in horseplay."). Defendant also told 
Officer Seegmiller that the blood on his hand came from "picking pimples." 
(R161:89). 
However, the officers were immediately suspicious of defendant's 
characterization. Officer Darrell McCoy felt that Harris's injuries were the result 
of "more than just horse playing," and Officer Seegmiller noted that defendant's 
injuries were "very minimal compared to Mack Harris'[s]." (R161:91, 103). 
Defendant requested a witness statement form, but when Officer McCoy gave 
him one, he tore it up, telling him that "he had forgotten what had happened." 
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(R161:103-04). This was within a "matter of minutes, no more than an hour" 
after the incident (R161:104). 
Trial 
Harris did not report the attack as horseplay; instead, he reported the 
assault to corrections officers. At trial, defendant called four inmates who were 
also housed in C block at the time of the assault (R161:116,123,126,130). None 
of the witnesses could see into defendant and Harris's cell. 
Jared Eskelsen reported that he heard Harris call defendant a "bitch" and 
heard defendant say, "Don't hit me, Mack," before the altercation occurred 
(R161:118-19). He denied hearing Harris call for help from the corrections 
officers, and said that he did not hear any of the inmates yelling at Harris after he 
was taken from the cell (R161:121-22). 
The other defense witnesses stated that Harris was "touchy-feely" with 
people, and would intentionally annoy defendant. See (R161:124, 128, 131). 
However, two witnesses stated that they had never seen violent behavior or 
blows struck between Harris and defendant (R161:125, 128). Only Brian Bogart 
testified that Harris often pushed defendant around (R161:131). 
In rebuttal, the prosecution recalled Harris, who testified that he never had 
contact with defendant outside of his cell because defendant was in a different 
"clique" from Harris (R161:137). He explained that he never had contact with 
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defendant in the day room "because [defendant] was always over, as they call it, 
[with] their white supremacist group." (R161:137). 
Harris, who is black, testified that Bogart had "Aryan or supremacist 
tattoos" (R161:137). He also testified that "they all look up to" Bogart. "He's 
supposed to be Mr. Penitentiary, and they all look up to him." (R161137). When 
asked if any of them had ever made racial comments to him, Harris testified that 
Bogart had called him a "f***ing nig***" (Rl61:138). He also testified that both 
Bogart and Eskelsen had called him a "f***ing rat" after he called for help on the 
intercom (R16V.138). 
Defense counsel did not immediately object to the testimony regarding 
white supremacy (R161:137-38). However, he objected following the testimony 
that they had called Harris a "f***ing rat," arguing that the testimony was 
hearsay, "removed from any rebuttal evidence," "totally speculative," and that 
there was "no talk about racism" on direct (R161:138-39). 
The prosecutor argued that it was direct impeachment of the witnesses 
(R161:139). Defense counsel argued that the prosecution was "introducing a 
whole new line of issues that are not relevant" and was taking off "into this flight 
of fancy about a white supremacist group." (R161:139). The prosecutor 
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responded by stating that it showed "bias and (inaudible)/7 (R161:139).a The 
court overruled the objection (R161:139). 
On cross-examination, defense counsel elicited testimony from Harris that 
he had a "black pride tattoo/7 (R161:140). Defense counsel also had Harris 
describe Bogart's tattoo, which Harris said was "a dagger on the back of his leg/7 
(R161:140). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Defendant's argument that Harris's rebuttal testimony constituted hearsay 
is inadequately briefed, and should be disregarded by the Court. Even on the 
merits, Harris's rebuttal testimony was largely non-hearsay because it was not 
offered for the truth of the matter asserted. 
Defendant also argues that Harris's rebuttal testimony was inadmissible 
because it was character evidence precluded by rule 404(b), and should also have 
been precluded under rule 403 because its probative value was outweighed by its 
prejudicial effect. Defendant's 404 and 403 claims are unpreserved, and should 
only be reviewed for plain error and ineffective assistance of counsel. The 
evidence was not precluded under rule 404(b) because it was offered for a 
1
 During the hearing on the motion to arrest judgment, the prosecutor argued 
that the testimony was impeachment, and that it was not "going to the 
fundamental issue of whether or not that individual was in fact a white 
supremacist." (R162:6-7). He also argued that it "goes directly to 608(c) under 
bias." (R162:7). 
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proper, noncharacter purpose under rule 608 to show bias, prejudice, and motive 
to misrepresent. 
In any event, any error in allowing testimony regarding the racist views of 
defense witnesses was harmless. The physical evidence and other testimony 
overwhelmingly supported Harris's version of the assault. In addition, the 
credibility of the defense witnesses was already put in question by contradictory 
testimony from correctional officers. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR WHEN IT ADMITTED 
HARRIS'S REBUTTAL TESTIMONY. 
Defendant alleges that the trial court erred when it allowed the State to 
present Harris's rebuttal testimony (Aplt. br. at 2). Specifically, he asserts that 
the testimony was inadmissible because: 1) it was hearsay; 2) it was not 
admissible for an appropriate noncharacter purpose under rule 404(b); and 3) it 
was not admissible under rule 403 because the testimony was remote and 
speculative, and the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighed its 
probative value (Aplt. br. at 18). 
Defendant asserts that these issues were preserved in an objection raised at 
trial and in the motion to arrest judgement, but if not preserved, should be 
reviewed for plain error or ineffective assistance of counsel (Aplt. br. at 2). 
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A. Harris's rebuttal testimony was not hearsay because the 
statements were not offered for the truth of the matter 
asserted. 
Defendant asserts that "the testimony concerning what Bogart told Harris 
about his tattoo, and the fact that Bogart called Harris a 'f-ing nig***/is hearsay/7 
(Aplt. br. at 18). However, defendant never engages in any analysis of his 
hearsay argument. This argument is therefore inadequately briefed and should 
be disregarded by the Court.2 But even on the merits, this claim fails because the 
challenged statements were either non-hearsay because they were not offered for 
the truth of the matter asserted, or were elicited by defendant on cross-
examination. 
Defendant asserts that "[essentially Harrises] testimony on rebuttal is that 
none of the defense witnesses should be believed because they are all part of a 
white supremacist group," which "was based solely on a tattoo of a dagger 
belonging to one of the defense witnesses (Bogart), a conversation between 
2
 Under Rule 24 of Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, an appellant must 
submit a brief containing "reasoned analysis based upon relevant legal 
authority." State v. Sloan, 2003 UT App 170, f 13, 72 P.3d 138. "An issue is 
inadequately briefed when the overall analysis of the issue is so lacking as to 
shift the burden of research and argument to the reviewing court." Id. When a 
defendant's brief "fails to cite relevant authority or provide any meaningful 
analysis" regarding the issue presented, "[tjhis court has routinely declined to 
consider arguments which are not adequately briefed on appeal." State v. 
Shepherd, 1999 UT App 305, Tf 27,989 P.2d 503 (citing Burns v. Summerhays, 927 
P.2d 197,199 (Utah App. 1996)). 
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Harris and that witness that the tattoo was 'some kind of anti-anarchy' thing, and 
the fact that Bogart [sic]."3 (Aplt. br. at 18). 
When viewed in context, the record demonstrates that Harris's rebuttal 
testimony impeached the defense witnesses based upon their association with 
defendant in a white supremacist group, their association with Bogart, and 
Bogart's racist conduct against Harris. 
Harris testified in the State's case in chief (R161:64-85). In response, 
defendant called four inmates to testify concerning the relationship between 
Harris and defendant. They testified that Harris was always "touchy-feely," that 
he was "often putting his hands on other people," and that defendant and Harris 
were "getting on each other's nerves" (R161:124, 127-131). Bogart testified that 
he witnessed Harries repeatedly pushing defendant around, and specifically 
denied calling Harris a "f***ing rat" (R161:131,133). 
In response to this testimony, the State recalled Harris as a rebuttal 
witness, with no objection from defendant (R161:136-41) (addendum B). Harris 
explained that he was not "touchy-feely" with defendant. He testified that he 
and defendant "would never have any communication in the day room because 
[defendant] was always over [with], as they call it, their white supremacist 
group." (R161:137). 
3
 The end of this sentence is missing from appellant's brief. 
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Harris explained that all of the defense witnesses associated with 
defendant in the day room ("Mr. Rupp, Mr. Brian Bogart, and also the other 
gentlemen/7) (R161:137). He elaborated: "Every time we would come in from 
lock down, that was their clique. They would always clique up together in the 
day room, and they would - - like I say, if they was doing their work out to 
playing cards or whatever they was doing, but they would all be in their little 
inner circle together/' (R161:137). 
When asked whether any of the witnesses had made racial comments to 
him, Harris testified that Bogart had called him a "f***ing nig***" when he had 
refused to give up his commissary to Bogart (R161:138). 
Rule 801 defines hearsay as "[1] a statement, [2] other than one made by 
the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, [3] offered into evidence to 
prove the truth of the matter asserted." Utah R. Evid. 801(c). The statements 
made by Harris in rebuttal were not offered for the truth of the matter asserted, 
and are thus non-hearsay. 
Presumably, defendant objects to the following statements made by Harris 
as hearsay: (1) " . . . as they call it, their white supremacist group"; (2) "He was 
like, "You f***ing nig***'"; and (3) ".. . he said it was some kind of anti-anarchy or 
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something like that " (R161:137,138,140-41).4 The first two statements were 
not offered for the truth of the matter asserted, and are thus non-hearsay. "When 
an out-of-court statement is offered simply to prove that it was made, without 
regard to whether it is true, such testimony is not proscribed by the hearsay 
rule/7 State v. Sorensen, 617 R2d 333, 337 (Utah 1980). "Testimony of this nature 
does not violate the hearsay rule since the witness is asserting under oath a fact 
he personally knows, that is, that the statement was made/7 State v. Sibert, 310 
P.2d 388,391 (Utah 1957). 
The first two statements were not offered for their truth - that is, they were 
not offered to prove that in fact Harris was a f***ing nig***, or that it was in fact a 
white supremacist group. The statements were offered simply to prove that they 
were made, not for their truth. They were offered to support Harris's belief that 
the defense witnesses were biased against him. Therefore, they are non-hearsay, 
and the court did not err in overruling defendant's belated objection. 
B. One of Harris's rebuttal statements was elicited by defense 
counsel and was therefore invited error. 
The third statement regarding Bogart's explanation of the meaning of his 
tattoo was not elicited by the State, but by defendant's cross-examination of 
Harris: 
4Defendant did not object to any of these individual questions or answers, 
but objected to the line of questioning after the prosecution had moved on to 
another incident. See (Rl61:136-39). 
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Defense counsel: What is the tattoo that is a white supremacist tattoo 
that you're talking about? What does it say? 
Harris: He's got a dagger on the back of his leg that he said it was 
some kind of anti-anarchy or something like that, but he's got it on 
the back of his calf on his leg. 
Defense Counsel: It doesn't say, "Kill nig***s," it doesn't say, "White 
supremacist," it's a dagger on his leg. 
Harris: No, it's the comments that come out of Mr. Bogart's mouth. 
(R161:140-41). 
Defendant made no objection to Harris's answers. When "the testimony 
complained of [is] initially elicited by defense counsel's cross-examination [], any 
error [is] invited. 'We have held repeatedly that on appeal, a party cannot take 
advantage of an error committed at trial when that party led the trial court into 
committing the error.'" State v. Dominguez, 2003 UT App 158, If 33, 72 P.3d 127 
(quoting State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,1220 (Utah 1993)). 
If defendant found Harris's answers objectionable, he should have raised 
an objection. Because Bogart's statements regarding the meaning of the tattoo 
were invited by defendant, their admission was invited error, and should not be 
considered by this Court. 
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II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT PLAINLY ERR AND TRIAL COUNSEL 
WAS NOT INEFFECTIVE IN ALLOWING REBUTTAL TESTIMONY 
DEMONSTRATING WITNESS BIAS 
A. There was no plain error or ineffective assistance 
Defendant asserts that the trial court erred when it allowed rebuttal 
testimony concerning prior bad acts or conduct of a witness in violation of 404(b) 
(Aplt br. at 18). However, defendant never raised this objection during trial. 
Under Utah's preservation rule, "'a contemporaneous objection or some form of 
specific preservation of claims of error must be made a part of the trial court 
record before an appellate court will review such claim[s]/" State v. Johnson, 774. 
P.2d 1141, 1144 (Utah 1989) (quoting State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 551 (Utah 
1987)). In addition, the objection below must be "specific enough to give the trial 
court notice of the very error .. . complained of." Tolman v. Winchester Hills Water 
Co., Inc., 912 P.2d 457,460 (Utah App. 1996) (citation omitted). 
In this case, the victim, Mr. Harris, testified in the State's case in chief 
(R161:64-85). Following the defense case, the State re-called Mr. Harris as a 
rebuttal witness (R161:136). Defendant did not object to Mr. Harris being called 
as a rebuttal witness. However, part-way into Mr. Harris's rebuttal testimony, 
the defense objected to certain testimony, asserting that it was hearsay (R161:138-
139). The court overruled the objection and allowed the testimony (R161:139). 
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Defendant renewed his hearsay objection in his motion to arrest judgment, and 
raised, for the first time, an objection based on Rule 702 (R123).5 
On appeal, defendant has abandoned his rule 702 objection, and instead 
argues for the first time that the testimony was inadmissible because it was 
character evidence precluded by rule 404(b) (Aplt. br. at 13, 18 & 23). This 
objection was never raised in the trial court. Accordingly, defendant argues that 
the issue may be reviewed for plain error or ineffective assistance of counsel 
(Aplt. br. at 2 & 13). 
To establish plain error, defendant must show: "(i) [a]n error exists; (ii) the 
error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, 
i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome 
for the appellant " State v. Cruz, 2005 UT 45, ^ 16,122 P.3d 543 (quotations 
and citation omitted). In this case, no error occurred, let alone obvious error, and 
even if error did occur, it was harmless. Moreover, defense counsel was not 
ineffective for failing to object to the testimony, because it was admissible. 
"[T]he failure of counsel to make motions or objections which would be futile if 
raised does not constitute ineffective assistance/' State v. Whittle, 1999 UT 96, 
1f34, 989 P.2d 52 (quotations and citations omitted). 
5
 Defendant claimed that Harris was testifying as an expert as to what certain 
tattoos meant, and argued that no foundation had been laid for Harris's 
knowledge (R123). 
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B. Harris's rebuttal testimony was not precluded by rule 404(b), 
because it was offered for a proper non-character purpose 
Utah's rule of evidence 404(b) states that "[e]vidence of other crimes, 
wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to 
show action in conformity therewith/' Defendant asserts that there is no proper 
non-character purpose for which Harris's rebuttal testimony could be offered, 
and it was therefore inadmissible (Aplt. br. at 19). However, the rebuttal 
testimony defendant objects to was not evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts, 
and was not offered to prove character. It was rebuttal testimony, consisting of 
statements heard by Harris, and a tattoo seen by Harris. It was offered as 
evidence of bias or prejudice to impeach the defense witnesses. 
At trial, defendant did not raise a rule 404(b) objection. The trial court did 
not plainly err by failing to sua sponte raise a 404(b) objection for the defendant.6 
Nor was defense counsel ineffective for not raising a 404(b) objection, because the 
testimony did not violate rule 404(b). Counsel was not ineffective for not making 
a futile objection. Whittle, 1999 UT 96 at Tf34. 
6
 Defendant argues that the court's error in failing to sua sponte engage in a 404(b) 
analysis was obvious because the law clearly requires a three-step analysis (Aplt. 
br. at 23-24). However, the error complained of is not that the court failed to 
engage in a proper 404(b) analysis, but that it failed to engage in any 404(b) 
analysis. The fact that controlling law dictates the method to resolve a 404(b) 
objection is irrelevant. In order to establish obvious error, defendant must 
demonstrate that the court should have known that it was required to interrupt 
Harris's testimony and raise a 404(b) objection for defendant. 
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C. Harris's rebuttal testimony was properly admitted under 
rule 608 to show bias, prejudice, and motive to misrepresent. 
The rebuttal testimony was "actually being offered for a proper, 
noncharacter purpose." State v. Decorso, 1999 UT 57, Tf21, 993 P.2d 837. The 
testimony was offered as impeachment evidence of bias, prejudice, or motive to 
misrepresent. The testimony was admissible under rule of evidence 608, which 
allows "[ejvidence of bias. Bias, prejudice, or any motive to misrepresent may be 
shown to impeach the witness either by examination of the witness or by evidence 
otherwise adduced." Utah R. Evid. 608(c) (emphasis added). Harris's testimony 
constituted evidence "otherwise adduced" to impeach the defense witnesses. See 
(R161:136-41) (addendum B).7 
"[Ejvidence of bias or motive is 'always relevant as discrediting the 
witness and affecting the weight of his testimony.'" State v. Hackford, 737 P.2d 
200, 203 (Utah 1987) (quoting Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974)) (additional 
citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, Harris's rebuttal 
testimony was permissible to introduce evidence of bias and motive on the part 
of the defense witnesses. Their close association with defendant in a group 
sharing ideological goals demonstrates a strong connection between defendant 
7
 In addition, even under Rule 404, "Evidence of a person's character or a trait of 
character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity 
therewith on a particular occasion, except:... (3) Character of witness. Evidence 
of the character of a witness, as provided in Rules 607, 608, and 609." Utah R. 
Evid. 404(a)(3). 
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and his witnesses. Such a connection evidences motive to misrepresent, affecting 
the weight of their testimony. See United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 52-53 (1984) 
(holding that trial court did not err by allowing evidence of defendant and 
witness's membership in Aryan Brotherhood, and explaining that "[a] witness7 
and party's common membership in an organization, even without proof that the 
witness or party has personally adopted its tenets, is certainly probative of bias"); 
see also Hackford, 737 P.2d at 203 (citing Abel). 
In addition, their calling themselves a "white supremacist group" 
demonstrated a potential for bias against Harris, who is black. Thus, race was 
not introduced as a means of unfairly prejudicing defendant, but of 
demonstrating bias and motive to misrepresent under Utah Rule of Evidence 
608(c). See Hackford, 737 P.2d at 203 ("[I]f a prior instance of conduct is relevant 
to a witness' bias or motive to testify differently than would otherwise be the 
case, evidence pertaining to that conduct is not subject to exclusion under Rule 
608(b).") (citation omitted). The testimony was admissible for a proper, 
noncharacter purpose and therefore rule 404(b) does not apply. 
D. Harris's rebuttal testimony was admissible under rule 403. 
Defendant alleges that Harris' rebuttal testimony was inadmissible under 
evidence rule 403, because the probative value of the testimony was substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice (Aplt. br. at 19). Like defendant's 
-20-
404(b) claim, his 403 objection was never raised in the trial court. Accordingly, 
the issue may be reviewed for plain error or ineffective assistance of counsel 
(Aplt. br. at 2 & 13). 
Rule 403 states: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue 
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence/' Utah R. 
Evid. 403. 
Defendant argues that Harris's rebuttal testimony was remote and 
speculative (Aplt. br. at 18). Defendant concedes that "the remoteness of 
evidence does not render it irrelevant/' but asserts that "it may, however, reduce 
its probative value." (Aplt. br. at 19). The record is unclear as to whether the 
evidence was remote. Nevertheless, even if remote, the evidence was admissible 
because it was highly probative in demonstrating the racial bias of Bogart, and 
the bias of the other defense witnesses based upon their association with 
defendant and Bogart in "as they call it, their white supremacist group." 
(R161:137). 
Defendant has provided no legal analysis of why Harris's statements were 
speculative, and therefore the argument should be disregarded.8 In any case, 
8
 When a defendant's brief "fails to cite relevant authority or provide any 
meaningful analysis" regarding the issue presented, "[t]his court has routinely 
declined to consider arguments which are not adequately briefed on appeal." 
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Harris did not speculate - he testified about things he heard and saw. His 
testimony was highly probative in demonstrating possible bias, prejudice, or 
motive to misrepresent. Because of their membership in a white supremacist 
group, the defense witnesses may have had a racial bias or prejudice against 
Harris, and may have had a motive to misrepresent. See Abel, 469 U.S. at 53 
("[The defense witness and defendant's] membership in the Aryan Brotherhood 
was not offered to convict either of a crime, but to impeach [the witness's] 
testimony."). 
Defendant argues that Harris's rebuttal testimony was inadmissible under 
rule 403 because "[p]rior to the rebuttal testimony, no mention of race had been 
made during trial/7 (Aplt. br. at 21). Defendant also asserts that the rebuttal 
testimony was inadmissible under rule 403 because it concerned only Bogart, and 
had no direct connection with defendant or the other defense witnesses (Aplt. br. 
at 19). Defendant therefore contends that the danger of unfair prejudice 
substantially outweighed probative value. 
The fact that the issue of race was not raised earlier is irrelevant, because 
the complained of testimony was offered in rebuttal as impeachment of the 
defense witnesses. In addition, the fact that specific racist acts and words were 
State v. Shepherd, 1999 UT App 305, \ 27, 989 P.2d 503 (citing Burns v. Summerhays, 
927 R2d 197,199 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
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only attributable to Bogart did not unfairly prejudice the jury against the 
defendant and the other defense witnesses. Harris specifically stated that all of 
the witnesses belonged to "as they call it, their white supremacist group/7 
(R161:137). He also testified that the members of the group looked up to Bogart 
as their leader, and then related specific instances of Bogart7 s racist conduct 
(R161:137-38). Thus, the testimony did not solely address "conduct by one 
witness/7 (Aplt. br. at 22). Rather, Harris testified that all of the defense 
witnesses were in the same "clique,77 "as they call it, their white supremacist 
group/7 (R161.-137). 
Harris provided evidence of bias or prejudice and motive to misrepresent 
in each witness based upon their association with defendant and Bogart in a 
white supremacist group. See Abel, 469 U.S. at 52-53. The fact that specific racist 
acts and words were only attributable to Bogart did not unfairly prejudice the 
jury against the other defense witnesses. Indeed, defendant could have recalled 
his witnesses in order to refute Harris's allegations of their membership in a 
white supremacist group, but he did not. 
"'Trial courts have wide discretion in determining relevance, probative 
value, and prejudice/77 State v. Kelt, 2002 UT 106, \ 32, 61 P.3d 1019 (quoting State 
v. Boyd, 2001 UT 30, f 23, 25 P.3d 985). "To find that an error has been made in 
admitting evidence in the face of a rule 403 objection, we must conclude that the 
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trial court abused its discretion in permitting the challenged evidence to be 
received. Specifically, we must find that the ruling in favor of admissibility was 
beyond the limits of reasonability." State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 404 (Utah 
1994) (citing State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232,239-40 (Utah 1992)). 
Although the court did not make specific 403 findings on the record,9 there 
is a basis in the record for the allowance of the rebuttal testimony in this case. See 
State v. Hackford, 737 P.2d 200, 204 (Utah 1987) ("[Ejven in the absence of such 
findings, we will still affirm if we can find some basis in the record for 
concluding that the trial court's action falls within the limits of permissible 
discretion under Rule 403.") (citing State v. Patterson, 656 P.2d 438, 438 (Utah 
1982)). 
The probative value of the testimony was high. Defendant admits that the 
case "turned on the credibility of Harris versus the credibility of the four defense 
witnesses/7 (Aplt. br. at 19). Therefore, testimony attacking the credibility of the 
defense witnesses, or providing evidence of bias, was highly probative. 
"[E]vidence of bias or motive is "' always relevant as discrediting the witness and 
affecting the weight of his testimony/"" Hackford, 737 P.2d 200, 203 (Utah 1987) 
(citations omitted). In addition, the danger of unfair prejudice was reduced by 
the other testimony and evidence presented at trial. 
9
 Because defendant did not raise this issue below, he did not seek 403 
findings. 
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The trial court did not plainly err by admitting the testimony 
demonstrating the witnesses' bias, prejudice, and motive to misrepresent. Any 
prejudicial effect did not outweigh its probative value, and the admission of the 
evidence was not "beyond the limits of reasonability." Menzies, 889 P.2d at 404. 
I l l ANY ERROR WAS HARMLESS 
Even if the court committed error by admitting the rebuttal testimony, any 
error was harmless in light of defense counsel's subsequent cross-examination of 
Harris, and the other testimony and evidence presented at trial. 
On cross-examination, defense counsel drew attention to Harris's "black 
pride tattoo," referring to it as "black supremacist tattoos." (R161:140). He also 
elicited testimony that Bogart's tattoo was merely a dagger on the back of his leg 
(R161:140-41). 
In addition, other trial testimony and the physical evidence corroborated 
Harris's version of the assault, and the key defense witness's testimony conflicted 
with the testimony of corrections officers. Harris described his beating in detail -
defendant hit him in the head and groin, pinned him to the ground, wrapped his 
arm around the metal stool that was bolted to the floor, and then struck his face 
repeatedly (R161:69-75). Harris's injuries corroborated his description of the 
beating - his face was bruised and lacerated, and his elbow had been shattered 
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(R161:79-80). In comparison, defendant's injuries consisted of scraped knuckles 
(R161:89,108). 
The testimony of Jared Eskelson directly contradicted Harris's testimony, 
naming Harris as the instigator (R161:118~19). He testified that he could hear the 
dialogue between Harris and defendant, but that he did not hear Harris call for 
help on the intercom, and did not hear any inmates yelling at Harris after he was 
removed from his cell (R161:121-22). Yet corrections officers confirmed that 
Harris made the intercom call for help, and that multiple inmates were 
screaming at Harris as they left C block (Rl61:76, 88, 90,101). 
The other defense witnesses had neither seen nor heard the fight, but 
testified that Harris regularly instigated physical contact with the defendant 
(R161:124, 128, 131). However, Harris testified that he never had contact with 
defendant outside of his cell because defendant was always with his "clique/' the 
defense witnesses. (R161:137). 
Additional evidence suggested that defendant was attempting to cover-up 
his crime. He threatened Harris after they were placed in A block and told him 
to report the attack as "horseplay," despite the extent of Harris's injuries 
(Rl61:78). Defendant reported the fight as "horseplay" to corrections officers, 
and then told an officer that he had "forgotten what had happened" shortly after 
the incident (R161:88,102,103-04,109). 
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In sum, the evidence corroborated Harris's testimony, and refuted 
defendant's claims. Questions about the credibility of the defense witnesses 
were raised by means other than the objected-to rebuttal testimony. Testimony 
of the defense witnesses was contradicted by testimony from corrections officers. 
In addition, the degree and nature of the victim's injuries and defendant's 
behavior following the assault, supported defendant's guilt. Therefore, any error 
in admitting Harris's rebuttal testimony was harmless. 
"'Notwithstanding error by the trial court, we will not reverse a conviction 
if we find that the error was harmless.'" State v. Rhinehart, 2006 UT App 517, f^ 28 
(quoting State v. Calliham, 2002 UT 86, \ 45, 55 P.3d 573). Therefore, this Court 
should decline defendant's request to reverse his conviction. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that this Court 
affirm defendant's conviction. 
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1 I MR, CRAMER: No other witnesses, your Honor. At this 
2 J time the defense rests. 
3 I THE COURT: The defense having rested, Mr. Shaum, any 
4 rebuttal witnesses at this time? 
5 I MR. SHAUM: Your Honor, we'll call Mr. Harris again just 
6 briefly. 
7 I THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Harris, again I will remind you 
8 I that you still are under oath, okay? 
9 MR. HARRIS: Yes, sir. 
10 DIRECT EXAMINATION 
11 BY MR. SHAUM: 
12 I Q. Mr. Harris, you've been here during the testimony of the 
13 individuals called by the defense, correct? 
14 I A. Yes, sir. 
15 I Q. At least two of them talked about you being — let's 
16 see, Mr. Bogart said you were kind of touchy feely, and I think 
17 I Mr. Rupp said that you were kind of a hands-on type of person. 
18 J You'd pat him on the back or you pushed — well, and they both 
19 testified that you were hands on with the defendant. Do you 
20 I recall any time where you put your hands on the defendant in view 
21 of anybody or at all? 
22 A. No, sir. The only time I ever put my hands on 
23 Mr. Bryant is to push him away from me and get him off of me. 
24 These guys that testified said that we would come out of the cell 
25 and I was down in the day room touchy feely, me and Mr. Bryant 
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1 would never have any communication in the day room because 
2 Mr. Bryant was always over, as they call it, their white 
3 supremacist group. They would all be over in a different part of 
4 the day room. Either they will be working out or they will be 
5 talking with one another, or you know, they just sitting there 
6 maybe watching t.v. or playing pinochle or whatever. 
7 Q. Who is they? 
8 A. As far as the individuals, Mr. Rupp, Mr. Brian Bogart, 
9 and also the other gentlemen. 
10 Q. So these individuals actually associated with the 
11 defendant when they had a chance? 
12 A. Oh, yeah. Every time we would come in from lock down, 
13 that was their clique. They would always clique up together in 
14 the day room, and they would — like I say, if they was doing 
15 their work out to playing cards or whatever they was doing, but 
16 they would all be in their little inner circle together. 
17 Q. You mentioned something about — you made a comment 
18 about white supremacist group. What makes you believe that they 
19 have some tendencies towards prejudices against blacks or any 
20 other group? 
21 I A. Well, for what it is, you can see the tatoos on 
22 Mr. Bogart. For another thing, they all look up to Mr. Bogart 
23 as Mr. Penitentiary. He's supposed to be Mr. Penitentiary, and 
24 they all look up to him. You can see the Aryan or supremacist 
25 tattoos that Mr. Bogart also wears, too. 
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1 J Q. Has any of them ever made any racial comments towards 
2 you? 
3 J A. The only time — I was in A block when I first came back 
4 I to jail. Mr. Brian Bogart had called me a fucking nigger one 
5 I time because I wouldn't give him some of my commissary. He was 
6 I like, "You fucking nigger." He didn't get up in my face or say 
7 I anything like that. He just made the reply. I was the on the 
8 J top tier, he was on the lower tier. He made the reply, ^ vYou 
9 fucking nigger," and then he just walked off. I heard it, but I 
10 J left it alone, you know. 
11 I Q. Did you hear Mr. Bogart say anything on the C block 
12 after Officer Seegmiller — Deputy Seegmiller went in to talk to 
13 you about what had happened between you and Mr. Bryant? 
14 I A. It was not only Mr. Bogart, but it was also — what was 
15 the first gentleman's name? Mr. See — 
16 Q. Jared Eskelsen? 
17 A. Yeah, Jared Eskelsen. Between them two yelling, I mean, 
18 I it was — like I said, it was all this, "You — " excuse me, 
19 ladies, but was — 
20 MR. CRAMER: Your Honor, I'm going to object. 
21 THE WITNESS: — you fucking rat — 
22 THE COURT: Hold on. 
23 MR. CRAMER: This is so hearsay, this is so — 
24 THE WITNESS: No, I'm telling — I'm — 
25 THE COURT: Hold on, Mr. Harris. 
-139-
1 J MR. CRAMER: This is so far removed from any rebuttal 
2 evidence at all. It's just totally speculative. He brings it 
3 I up now. There's no talk about racism in his direct. When I call 
4 him there is no talk about it. Suddenly there's talk of tattoos, 
5 J and it's just completely. 
6 THE COURT: Mr. Shaum? 
7 I MR. SHAUM: Your Honor, nobody asked about that, and 
8 J this is direct impeachment of those witnesses. Both Mr. Bogart, 
9 number one, who testified he never said anything like that. 
10 Number two, Mr. Eskelsen says he didn't recall the defendant 
11 saying anything or that he — was he involved in any of that. 
12 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Shaum. Mr. Cramer? 
13 I MR. CRAMER: Well, your Honor, just — it's one thing 
14 I to say no, I heard them say that on rebuttal, but now he's 
15 introducing a whole new line of issues that are not relevant to 
16 what was said. He can stand up there and say no, I heard them 
17 I say that, or no, they didn't say that. But then to take off into 
18 this flight of fancy about a white supremacist group, I think is 
19 just — 
20 MR. SHAUM: Well, it's bias and (inaudible). 
21 THE COURT: Any other record, Mr. Cramer? 
22 MR. CRAMER: Nothing, your Honor. 
23 THE COURT: The Court is going to overrule the 
24 objection. Go ahead, Mr. Shaum. 
25 Q. BY MR. SHAUM: What did Mr. Bogart say, then, when 
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1 J Deputy Seegmiller went into the cell? 
2 J A. After — it was before Deputy Seegmiller and after 
3 Deputy Seegmiller came in, it was Brian Bogart yelling right 
4 there at this door, ^You F'ing rat. You F'ing rat." Then as 
5 I they escorted me after I gathered all of my belongings out of 
6 I the cell and I was walking down the steps to go out of the pod, 
7 I that's when Brian Bogart said again, "You F'ing rat. You F7ing 
8 rat." 
9 J Q. He's saying that? Do you know why? Did he tell you 
10 why --
11 J A. Because Bryant — Mr. Bryant had went down the pod and 
12 I told them that I hit the button, that I had hit the intercom 
13 button to call security. 
14 I MR. CRAMER: Objection, your Honor, that's hearsay. 
15 THE COURT: Sustained. 
16 MR. SHAUM: No further questions, your Honor. 
17 CROSS EXAMINATION 
18 BY MR. CRAMER: 
19 Q. Do you want to show us your black supremacist tattoos? 
20 A. No, I don't have any black supremacist tattoos. I've 
21 got a black pride tattoo saying that I am proud to be a black 
22 man, but I — it's not a supremacist thing. 
23 I Q. Okay. What is the tattoo that is a white supremacist 
24 tattoo that you're talking about? What does it say? 
25 A. He's got a dagger on the back of his leg that he said it 
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1 was some kind of anti-anarchy or something like that, but he's 
2 I got it on the back of his calf on his leg. 
3 Q. It doesn't say, "Kill niggers," it doesn't say, "White 
4 supremacist," it's a dagger on his leg. 
5 I A. No, it's the comments that come out of Mr. Bogart's 
6 J mouth. Now you're — 
7 J Q. Well, you said it was a white supremacist tattoo, and 
8 it's not, is it? 
9 MR. SHAUM: Your Honor, I object. This is 
10 I argumentative. 
11 I THE COURT: Mr. Cramer, Mr. Cramer, settle down. 
12 THE WITNESS: Like I said, he --
13 THE COURT: Hold on. Hold on. Hold on. Mr. Cramer, do 
14 I you have a question for the witness? 
15 Q. BY MR. CRAMER: So the tattoo that you saw on his leg 
16 was a dagger? 
17 A. What I seen on his leg and what he explained to me. 
18 I We sat there at the day room table with Mr. Brian Bogart, and he 
19 I turned around and told me and he explained to me what was that 
20 tattoo for. 
21 MR. CRAMER: Nothing further, your Honor. 
22 THE COURT: Mr. Shaum? 
23 MR. SHAUM: No further questions. 
24 THE COURT: Ms. Harris, you can step down. Thank you. 
25 I Any other rebuttal witnesses?-
